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Robust Website Fingerprinting Through the Cache Occupancy Channel | Anatoly Shusterman | NULLCON Webinar
Robust Website Fingerprinting Through the Cache Occupancy Channel | Anatoly Shusterman | NULLCON Webinar
Talk Abstract:
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Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack model used to evaluate website fingerprinting attacks assume an on-path adversary, who can observe all traffic traveling between the user's computer and the secure network.

This talk introduces a different attack model, in which the adversary is capable of sending a small amount of malicious JavaScript code to the target user's computer. The malicious code mounts a cache side-channel attack, which exploits the effects of contention on the CPU's cache, to identify other websites being browsed.
Refs: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-shusterman.pdf 

Speaker Bio: 
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Anatoly is a Ph.D. student at the Information Systems Engineering Department at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. He specializes in machine learning and big data analytics. His research interests include Hardware side-channel attacks and Machine Learning algorithms.

Jul 1, 2020 04:00 PM in India

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